Written by: Annabelle Zehner
Edited by: Bérénice Louveau
Photograph: Sputnik/Alexander Kazakov
On September 3rd, 2025, China commemorated the 80th anniversary of its defeat of Japan in World War II with a military parade. In the West, attention was drawn to the “massive” scale of the event- the state’s largest ever- as well as the technology and diplomatic ties on display. Over 50,000 people gathered in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, bearing witness to new laser weapons, nuclear ballistic missiles, and robotic wolves. Chinese President Xi Jinping appeared at the event with Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, marking the first time the three leaders have been seen together, in an intentional exhibit of diplomatic unity. With concerns over Chinese intentions behind this show of strength on the rise, it is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore how the state has been steadily politicising its history as a tool for national interests.
Indeed, China is no stranger to such large-scale military displays, which help to legitimise the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) leadership. Not only does September 3rd mark the end of WWII in the Pacific theatre, it also signifies the end of what is known in China as the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, which began in 1931 with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. This resistance, however, was not led and carried out by CCP troops alone, but in an uneasy alliance with Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) army. At the time of Allied victory in WWII, the KMT was recognised as the government of China. Even after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, marking the retreat of the KMT to Taiwan and the beginning of CCP rule of the mainland, the permanent Chinese seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was recognised as belonging to the KMT. Although this did eventually change in 1971, with the PRC being recognised as the sole representative of China at the UN, it is not surprising that China continues to use September 3rd as a chance to display its military might.
The 2025 parade signifies a doubling down on this strategy, especially when contrasted with the 70th anniversary celebrations 10 years earlier. In 2015, while the PRC also hosted a military parade of unprecedented scale, Xi emphasised the joint role the KMT and the CCP had in defeating Japan, with KMT veterans being invited to march in the parade. In 2025, the PRC placed much greater emphasis on the fact that the date also marked 80 years since the restoration of Taiwanese rule to China. Upon Japanese defeat, Taiwan was returned to the hands of the KMT, as the internationally recognised government of China at the time. However, the discourse from the mainland ignores this technicality, asserting that Taiwan is part of the PRC. It is in this context that Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te barred Taiwanese politicians from attending the Victory Day parade in Beijing.
How the Chinese government chooses to frame and commemorate its war with Japan results in the politicisation of history. The differences between the 70th and 80th anniversary celebrations can be attributed to changes in the international political and security landscapes. The 2015 parade was actually the first of its kind in recognition of Victory Day. Although many questioned its methods, the message that day was one of peace and cooperation. At the time, Ma Ying-jeou, a member of the KMT party who sought closer relations with the mainland despite historical tensions, was president of Taiwan. By contrast, Taiwan is now led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) under Lai, seeking to carve out a more distinctly Taiwanese identity for the island, separate from the PRC. As such, Xi has had to adjust his approach to the policy ambition of Chinese reunification, as Taiwan’s decreased interest in relations with the mainland necessitates more aggressive tactics. The massive scale of the 2025 parade serves as a firm reminder to Taiwan and the world that China possesses the largest military on the planet.
Furthermore, the public display of an alliance with Russia and North Korea reveals the potential formation of an authoritarian bloc as a threat to the liberal democratic West. Indeed, President Donald Trump reacted by accusing China of “conspiring against the United States” on social media. While these claims were quickly dismissed, this show of unity marks a distinct shift from 2015. At that time, US President Barack Obama had made concerted efforts to increase cooperation with China on issues like climate change (enabling the Paris Agreement), nuclear security, global health, and cultural exchange. Trump, on the other hand, has a more aggressive approach to Sino-American relations, most notably in his re-escalation of the trade war. While it is too early to fully understand the implications of the growing alliance between the three autocratic countries, it does send a powerful message of authoritarian regional cooperation.
What is ultimately clear is that while parades and public commemorations may be fixtures of Chinese politics, their purposes and implications will continue to change with the geopolitical landscape, so long as China continues to use history as a way of expressing political intent and military power.